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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final order of the Second District Court denying Mr.
Sullivan's motion to set aside an order dismissing Ms. Sullivan's divorce
complaint filed on September 26, 2002 (Case No. 024701693 DA) (hereinafter the
"First Complaint"), refusing to consolidate the case with Ms. Sullivan's later-filed
divorce action (Case No. 034700173 DA)(hereinafter the "Second Complaint"),
and finding that the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act in Case No. 034700173 DA to
determine custody issues. The original order was entered on September 22, 2003,
and an amended order was entered on October 28, 2003. This court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h) and Rule 3(a) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint and
allowing her to proceed under her Second Complaint when the jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA was determined at the time of filing of the First Complaint?
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of
law and is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial
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court. Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, f 2, 20 P.3d 895.
Issue Preserved: Record p.l 18, interior pages 3 (lines 9 through 21), 4
(lines 2 through 7), 6 (lines 6 through 22), 7 (lines 8 through 12), 9 (lines 20
through 25), and 10 (lines 1 through 9).
2. Did Mr. Sullivan file his action in Illinois in a timely manner?
Standard of Review: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. Smith Inv. Co. v.
Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, interior page 4 (lines 2 through 24) and
interior page 15 (lines 15 through 20); Record pages 257 and 258.
3. Did the trial court err in finding that Ms. Sullivan did not act
surreptitiously or wrongfully by taking the parties' children from the State of
Illinois under false pretenses, and in not declining jurisdiction by reason of her
conduct?
Standard of Review: Issues which involve application of statutory law to
the facts present mixed questions of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed
for clear error and conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, giving the trial
court some discretion in applying the lawr to the facts. In re G.B., 2002 UT App
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270,111, 53 P.3d 963.
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, interior pages 8 and 9; Record, p. 256 and
257.
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
1. Rules 41(a)(2)(ii) and 42, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; U.C.A. § 7845c-208.
2. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UUCCJEA), §§ 78-45c-102(7), 201(l)(a through (d), and other applicable
sections; Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (IUCCJA), Illinois Revised
Statutes, 750-5/601, et seq., and 750-35/1, et seq.\ Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act (PKPA), 11 U.S.C. § 1738A (c).
3. U.C.A. §78-45c-110(l).
4. U.C.A. § 78-45c-208.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married in August 1995 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and
have a son, Brett, born on April 2, 1996, and a daughter, Sydney, born on July 18,
1997. The parties moved to Illinois in December 1999 and were living in
Thompsonville, Illinois, in June, 2002. On or about June 26, 2002, Ms. Sullivan
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took the children with her to Idaho on the pretext that she was going to visit her
family. She then took the children to Utah and filed her First Complaint for
divorce on September 26, 2002. Mr. Sullivan was served with the First Complaint
on or about November 27, 2002, and filed an answer on December 27, 2002,
contesting the Utah court's jurisdiction and asserting that Illinois had jurisdiction
as the home state pursuant to the UCCJEA, since the children had lived in Illinois
for more than six months before Ms. Sullivan left the State. Mr. Sullivan
thereafter filed a custody proceeding in Illinois on April 7, 2003. In the interim,
Ms. Sullivan filed the Second Complaint in Utah on January 28, 2003, claiming
that she had been in Utah for six months and that Utah now qualified as the home
state. When Mr. Sullivan moved to consolidate the two divorce proceedings under
the earlier filed case, Ms. Sullivan objected and moved to dismiss her first
complaint. The Utah trial court mistakenly dismissed the Ms. Sullivan's first
complaint before the time for briefing had elapsed. Following a hearing, however,
the Court allowed the dismissal to stand, found that Mr. Sullivan had waited too
long to file his complaint in Illinois, and found the Utah had jurisdiction over the
matter. Mr. Sullivan appeals from the dismissal of Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint
and the trial court's holding that Utah had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The parties were married on August 26, 1995, in New Mexico, and have
two minor children, Brett Sullivan, age 8, and Sydney Sullivan, age 6. The parties
and their minor children resided in Illinois between December 1999 and July
2002. Record, pp. 201 and 202, paragraphs 2 and 5;
2. On or about June 20, 2002, Ms. Sullivan surreptitiously left Illinois with
the children, claiming that she was going to Idaho to attend a family reunion and
that she would return to Illinois. She thereafter went to Utah. Record, pp. 119.
3. Ms. Sullivan claimed repeatedly that she was only visiting Utah
temporarily. Mr. Sullivan thought her stay in Utah was temporary and that she
would return to Illinois. Mr. Sullivan Record, p. 224; p. 119, p. 188, interior page
6, lines 12 through 15.
4. Ms. Sullivan filed her First Complaint for divorce in the Second District
Court, Farmington Department, on September 26, 2002, Civil No. 024701693 DA.
Record, p. 201-212.
5. Mr. Sullivan was served with the First Complaint in Illinois on
November 27, 2002. Record, p. 222. He filed an answer on December 27, 2002
(hereinafter the "First Answer") disputing the Utah court's jurisdiction and
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requesting that all proceedings relating to custody of the minor children be
referred to the Circuit Court of Hamilton County, Illinois, in McLeansboro,
Illinois. Record, p. 223-226.
6. Ms. Sullivan filed her Second Complaint on January 28, 2003, Civil No.
034700173. Record, pp. 1-5. The Second Complaint was served on Mr. Sullivan
on March 19, 2003. Record, p. 9.
7. Mr. Sullivan filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003, in the
Second Judicial Circuit Court for Hamilton County, Illinois, case number 03-F-5.
Record, pp. 112-116; pp. 245-252.
8. Mr. Sullivan filed an Answer to the Petitioner's Second Complaint on
April 22, 2003 (hereinafter "the Second Answer"). Record, pp. 117-120. At the
same time, he also filed a Motion to Consolidate the two divorce actions under the
earlier-filed civil number pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and Rule 4-107 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (now part of Rule
42), or in the alternative to dismiss the later-filed complaint. Record, pp. 232-233.
9. On or about April 29, 2003, Ms. Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss the
First Complaint and her objection to Mr. Sullivan's motion to consolidate.
Record, pp 234-237.
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10. On or about May 2, 2003, Ms. Sullivan submitted to the jurisdiction of
the Illinois court by filing her general appearance and answer in case number 03F-5. Record, p. 194.
11. On May 15, 2003, the Utah trial court prematurely entered an order
dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint (hereinafter "the Dismissal Order").
Record, p. 253. The trial court later concluded that the Dismissal Order was
untimely. See Amended Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order
Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint (hereinafter "the Amended Order of Denial").
Record, p. 146, paragraph 3.
12. On May 28, 2003, Mr. Sullivan filed a motion to set aside the Dismissal
Order with a supporting memorandum. Record, pp. 259-267.
13. A hearing was held on August 7, 2003, before the Honorable Darwin C.
Hansen on Mr. Sullivan's motion to set aside the Dismissal Order and motion to
consolidate Ms. Sullivan's two divorce cases. Record, p. 273 and p. 188
(transcript). At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Hansen declined to set aside
the Dismissal Order because he found that Mr. Sullivan had not taken steps to
proceed in Illinois within six months of Ms. Sullivan leaving Illinois. Judge
Hansen found that the Utah court had jurisdiction of the custody issues relating to
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the parties' minor children. Record, page 146, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3; p. 188,
interior page 19.
14. The Utah court entered its Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside Order Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint on September 22, 2003. Record,
p. 277. Mr. Sullivan's Notice of Appeal was filed on October 22, 2003. Record,
p. 148. An Amended Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order
Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint was entered on October 28, 2003. Record, p.
145.
15. On December 30, 2003, Mr. Sullivan filed an Emergency Petition for
Temporary Child Custody in Hamilton County, Illinois. Record, p. 163. On
December 31, 2003, The Illinois court, Honorable Barry L. Vaughan presiding,
issued an Order for Temporary Child Custody finding that Illinois was the home
state of the parties' minor children at the commencement of Ms. Sullivan's divorce
action in September 2002, and that the Utah court had erred in not staying its
proceeding and in not communicating with the Illinois court upon learning that
Mr. Sullivan had a pending Illinois custody action. The Illinois court awarded Mr.
Sullivan temporary custody pending further proceedings. Record, pp. 170 and
171. The Illinois court entered a preliminary injunction on January 5, 2004, but
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changed its position after a telephone conference with Judge Hansen on January 8,
2004, and entered an order vacating the preliminary injunction. Record, pp. 172174.
16. Certain Illinois court documents are not part of the Utah court file, but
may be important for the Court to consider in this action and are therefore filed
with the Addendum to this Brief. They include the Partial Transcript of
Videotaped Telephone Conference of Judge Hansen's and Judge Vaughan's
conversation on January 8, 2004, and the Rule 23 Order of the Appellate Court of
Illinois, Fifth District, entered on May 21, 2004, affirming Judge Vaughan's order
setting aside the preliminary injunction. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the
Illinois action was effectively stayed pending this Court's decision on Mr.
Sullivan's appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in allowing Ms. Sullivan to proceed with her Second
Complaint when her First Complaint did not establish home state jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA. She was not entitled to commence her case again to cure the
jurisdictional deficiency. The trial court should have consolidated the First
Complaint and Second Complaint or dismissed the Second Complaint as a
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duplication of the first. Mr. Sullivan actively contested jurisdiction in the Utah
court and requested that jurisdictional issues be referred to the Illinois court. The
Utah court made no determination about jurisdiction until after the Illinois
proceeding was filed.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint
and in Allowing Her to Proceed With Her Second Complaint.
A. Utah Does Not Have Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA.
When Ms. Sullivan filed her First Complaint on September 26, 2002, she

and the parties' children had been in Utah for less than three months. Pursuant to
U.C.A. § 78-45c-201(l)(a), "a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination only if this state is the home state of the child on the
date of the commencement of the proceeding...." [Emphasis added]. "Home
state" is defined in § 78-45c-102(7) as "the state in which a child lived with a
parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." Both Ms.
Sullivan and the Utah trial court acknowledged that the Utah court did not have
jurisdiction of the First Complaint under the UCCJEA. Illinois, where the parties
and their children had lived for almost three years, where Mr. Sullivan continued
-10-

to reside, where the children had a significant connection, and where there was
substantial evidence about the children's care, schooling and relationships, was the
children's home state.
Rather than defer to the jurisdiction of Illinois,, Ms. Sullivan attempted to
bootstrap jurisdiction by filing a Second Complaint on January 28, 2003,
purpor tedly be> ond the six iiioi ill: i. time pe- :m, ,;,.
1 nil I I nuiipljiiil

1 In1 I lull

. . moving to disn liss the

mil i iiiiiiiiHltnl t nil mi III dismissing 1111• Fir I

< ' 11111111' i i n I in ni i I I i 111 if) w i mii" Ms S11111 v ni n 1 i i li; P r • i second bit*

-•• •- -

Court should have consolidated the two actions under the earlier-filed pleading, or
dismissed the Second Complaint as duplicative. Section 78-45c-201(l)(a) very
clearly allows a Utah court to make an initial custody determination only if Utah is
the home state when the proceeding is commenced.
B,

The Trial C o u r t Should Have Consolidated the Two Divorce
Cases
dismissed the Duplicative Second Complaint.
f

Judicial Administration and then Rule 4-107 ui in < •• * M:.<

'

Administration to consolidate Ms. Sullivan's two divorce cases under the earlierfiled case number,, or in the alternative to dismiss the Second C- - = pl.ib'

T

"

Sullivan objected to consolidation or dismissal of the Second Complaint, claiming

that she would be prejudiced by such action. However, Mr. Sullivan is the party
prejudiced by the trial court's failure to consolidate the two cases. Clearly Ms.
Sullivan was attempting to manipulate jurisdiction under the UCCJEA by trying to
commence her action again, after failing to meet UCCJEA jurisdictional
requirements with her First Complaint. She was not a position to object to
consolidation. In Raggenbuck v.Suhrmann, 325 P.2d 258 (Utah 1958), the court
upheld a trial court's order to consolidate eleven food poisoning cases, finding that
the order "did not violate any constitutional or statutory provision," and was not
prejudicial to the defendants. Id. at 259-260. In the present situation, Ms.
Sullivan prejudiced herself by filing her First Complaint when Utah was not the
children's home state. The Second Complaint does not remedy Ms. Sullivan's
failure to establish jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the trial court must
look to the date the proceeding was originally commenced by the First Complaint.
II.

Mr. Sullivan Filed His Custody Action in a Timely Manner.
A.

Mr. Sullivan's Delay in Filing in Illinois Does Not Give Utah
Jurisdiction or Deprive Illinois of Jurisdiction.

Mr. Sullivan filed his custody action in Illinois on April 7, 2003. He had
previously contested jurisdiction of Ms. Sullivan's First and Second Complaints
and had asserted that Illinois was the children's home state. At the time the Utah
-12-

court held its August 7, 2003, hearing on Mr. ^uiiivan b motion to set aside the
dismissal of Ms. SuilnaL o First Complaint, the Utah court had been made aware
of Mr, Sullivan's pending Illinois action. Even if the Utah court believed Mr.
Sullivan filed beyond the 6-month period under U.C.A. § 78-45c~201 (1 Va\ it
should have found undoi .

- -

i)(b) that I Jtah was not tia nome state and

11 in, ni I I I I ni miii*. s was (hi1 moii itp|>ju|iiMk Iniuin hcutu-.c llln i hi Id kin had a signili iiiilll
( i > 111 i n l i o n \ \ ni III ni il I I 11 i I in i s ., m 1111 s i n I > s I „ 1111 m a I r \ i n I n 11' i l • \ „ i s ., i ^ „ 111 „ i h 11 • m m i 111 m 11«ii s

regarding the children's care, iMotivtm*; ir.-nn --.

•.1 personal relationships.

In In re Custody ofBozarth, 538 N.E.2d 785 (111. App.2 Dist. 1989), the
Illinois Appellate Court considered a situation, where an Illinois residen

r

" ' »

object to a Washington court's exercise of jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The
Illinois appellate court, overturned the lower court's deferral to the W ashington
i I I I miI I and he lill as lul'lun s,

jurisdiction, nor does the fact that one court nas . w e e d e d in issuing a
custody order sooner than another court endow it with jurisdiction \\ w u, c>
not meet the requirements of the Act. In short, McKerr's failure to object to
the paternity action in Washington and that court's haste in issuing an
unsupported custody order sooner than another court endow it with
, .• jurisdiction if it does not meet the requirements of the Act." Id. at 792.,
In the present case, even if Mr. Sullivan were considered slow- to act in filing his
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custody action in Illinois, the Illinois court has a superior claim to jurisdiction
because Utah did not have jurisdiction when Ms. Sullivan filed her First
Complaint and the children's established residence was in Illinois. If neither state
could be considered the home state, the other factors under § 78-45c--201(l)(b)
favored Illinois as the state with the closest ties to the children.
B.

Ms. Sullivan's Temporary Absence from Illinois Should Have
Been Included in Calculating the Six-Month Period of Residence
in Illinois.

Ms. Sullivan told Mr. Sullivan repeatedly that she was only visiting Utah
temporarily and that she was planning to return with the children to Illinois.
Under the UCCJEA, § 78-45c-102(7), a period of temporary absence is part of the
six-month period. Therefore, any periods of time during which the children were
temporarily absent from Illinois, based on representations that Ms. Sullivan was
planning to return with them to Illinois, are added to and extend the six-month
period of time. In the case In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122 (111.
App. 3 Dist. 1993), the Third District Appellate Court of Illinois considered a
situation where a mother who had lived in Illinois with her child for almost a year
claimed that she met the 6-month requirement of the Illinois UCCJA. The Court
found that the mother's stay with the child in Illinois had been temporary and that
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Califoi i lia i ei i: laii led 111: le 1 101 i le state • ::)f tl le • ;:! ill ::! 1 1 1 s II
that '"temporary absence' does not connote a particular length of time, unuti
appropriate circumstances, the term can appl) 10 a penou ^i nu:.} montn^. A<. at
1124, citing Lidonnki

~- is, 16 F.2d 532, 534 (D.C.Cir. 1926) Likewise,

because of her repeated representations to Mr Sullivan that she was planning to
return to Illinois ,vi- .mi v^n > Vm> m I lati - .w,
Least ii

,. . ...... ... .. *,. .^

^e considered temporary, at

;;, ;~,..

...,

, .-

u •

Sec on
since it v a s f i l i a l f\MM

III

IIII'IIH

miiIIIIIi < ;illi i III ' I irsl ( ' i i m | i l . i i n l

Ms. Sullivan Took the Children From Illinois Under False Pretenses.
Under § 78-45c-208(l), the court is require.

me jurisdiction if the

party asserting jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct. In this case,, Ms
Sullivan took the children with her to Idaho on the pretext of attending a family
reunion, She repeatedly represented u> *.. - *livan that she would be returning

S u l l i v . n r ' ! ill I mi1, in f i l m * ' lir. . i r l i n n ill l l l i n n i s

m

In llmih'lit

In tsmilil lu

returning with the children to Illinois. The court considered evidence in the
pleadings and proffers made by Ms. Sullivan, which is marshaled as follows: "KIs.

'.

1 5

' , •

Sullivan made Mr. Sullivan aware of her location in Utah and did not secrete the
children (Record, p. 188, interior page 12, lines 9-11); Ms. Sullivan had allowed
recent telephone contacts with the children (Record, p. 188, interior page 12, lines
3 through 8); Ms. Sullivan received cards from Mr. Sullivan's mother
acknowledging receipt of cards from the children (Record, p. 188, interior page
11, lines 23-25 and page 12, lines 1-3); and Ms. Sullivan talked with Mr. Sullivan
(Record p. 188, interior page 12, lines 11-12).
Despite this marshaled evidence, the trial court erred in finding that Ms.
Sullivan did not act unjustifiably. She did not deny that she left Illinois with the
children under false pretenses or that she repeatedly assured Mr. Sullivan that she
planned to return to Illinois with the children. She should not be allowed to
benefit from her misrepresentations, which were among the reasons Mr. Sullivan
held off filing in Illinois. Ms. Sullivan's conduct was unjustifiable and the trial
court should have declined jurisdiction for that reason.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Sullivan should not be allowed to circumvent the clear language of the
UCCJEA by filing the same complaint twice. She should be held to the
commencement date created by filing her First Complaint on September 26, 2002.
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Since

f

'

-

deferred to the jurisdiction of the Illii iois mini

i ill! >iilln .111

' IHII ill

11 i

filing in Illinois was timely under the UCCJEA. Ms. Sullivan made repeated
representations that her absence from Illinois was temporary, which extended the
six-month period for Illinois to be considered the home state to the time of Mr.
n,\ N ;... -i.. luduu, .-,,„ ,,,. - ,,, "^.mt should have declined jurisdiction
.i^i .oiiJUc; ii removing the children from
Illinois undet

:. •>• t -

.

the trial court s dismissal ? \t

•

!

. ia reverse

I

i

the First and Second Complaints uiidei ilie earlier ii.--

^

>

exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, and should defer to UK, jurisdiction ui the
Illinois court
DATED this j£_

day of June, 2004.
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UTAH RUI.ES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914 (1909).
Refusal to grant continuance in personal injury case was an abuse of discretion where
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial because of his physical condition, there was no
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff's testimony was essential to his
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373
P.2d 375 (1962).
Defendant was not prejudiced by court's refusal to grant a continuance after defendant
herself had stated that her illness probably
would not impair her ability to function at the
trial other than by causing her some discomfort
and the trial court made provisions to accommodate defendant in case the illness forced her
to leave suddenly. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d
585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Discretion of court.
Denial of motion for continuance was within
discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924).
Trial courts have substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances.
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 R2d 1375 (Utah
1988).
—Inability of counsel to attend trial.
The inability of counsel to be present at the
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle his
client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon,
560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Unavoidable absence.
When counsel has made timely objections,
jiven necessary notice, and has made a reasonible effort to have the trial date changed for
food cause, it would be an abuse of discretion
lot to grant a continuance. Griffiths v.
lammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
—New theory of case.
Continuance could be obtained to develop a
heory of the case suggested after issue joined
nd before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah 393
L877).
-Procedural delays.
Court properly denied motion for continance in action based on credit card obligation
r
hich had been procedurally delayed for two
nd a half years by interrogatories and by
arious motions of the defendant; and although
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trial date had been set for four months, motion
for continuance was not filed until nine days
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975).
— Supporting affidavits.
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
—Unavailable witness.
Lack of diligence.
Where subpoena for absent witness was not
placed in hands of an officer for service until the
morning the case was called for trial, though it
had been set for several weeks, and the witness
had testified at a former trial, continuance was
denied. Corporation of Members of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Watson, 30
Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906).
In malpractice action, motion for continuance
based on plaintiff's inability to serve subpoena
on vacationing medical witness was properly
denied, where plaintiff had made no effort to
depose witness and had never contacted witness for the purpose of testifying. Maxfield v.
Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975).
After plaintiff had been granted one continuance because of unavailability of her preferred
expert witness, and her second request for a
continuance several months later was solely
due to her own failure to retain and designate a
new expert witness in a timely manner, there
was no abuse in the district court's denial of
plaintiff's second motion. Hill v. Dickerson, 839
P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Need.
Where the defendant's counsel had three
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
witnesses, purportedly important to his case,
were actually present at trial and thus subject
to cross-examination, the purely speculative
need for a third witness did not entitle the
defendant to the granting of a motion for continuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109
(Utah 1985).
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927
(Utah 1978); Holbrook v. Master Protection
Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, 46 P.3d
753, cert, denied, — UT —, 59 P.3d 603.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance
1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83,
L
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.;
\ C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35.
AX.R. —Admissions to prevent continuance

sought to secure testimony of absent witness in
civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon
applicant's payment of costs or expenses incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Aile 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and
anv aoDlicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
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adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court
of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action;
or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintifFs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court
as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the
trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed
action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the
same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and
may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the
order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party
dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed
such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom
such provisional remedy was obtained.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d)
of this rule are similar to Rule 41, F.R C.P.
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—•—Second dismissal.
By its express terms, the two-dismissal rule
provided in this rule applies only when the
notice of dismissal is filed twice by the plaintiff
in the action. Pilcher v. State, Dep't of Social
Servs., 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983).
——Quashing of previous summons.
Where a summons is quashed pursuant to
Rule 4(b) and plaintiff is subsequently granted
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision
(a)(1) of this rule, the two-dismissal rule of
Subdivision (a)U) of this rule is not applicable.
Brimhall v. Seagull Inv. Co., 25 Utah 2d 201,
479 P.2d 468 (1970).
Cited in Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16,
268 P.2d 986 (1954); Bunting Tractor Co. v.
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Emmett D. Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275,
272 P2d 191 (1954); K L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656
P.2d 986 (Utah 1982); Pitman v. Bonham, 677
R2d 1126 (Utah 1984); State v. Poteet, 692 P2d
760 (Utah 1984); Burton v. Youngblood, 711
P.2d 245 (Utah 1985); Meadow Fresh Farms v.
Utah State Univ. Dept of Agric. & Applied
Science, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873
P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); C&Y Corp. v.
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995); Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah
Dep't of Cors., 942 R2d 933 (Utah 1997); Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d
1147; Albrecht v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 64, 44
R3d 838; Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT
7, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 67 P.3d 466.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments ment of jury, 31 A.L.R.3d 449.
in Utah Law — Civil Procedure, 2001 Utah L.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as
Rev. 1026.
affected by opponent's motion for summary
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 22; 24 judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or diAm. Jur. 2d Dismissal, Discontinuance, and rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Nonsuit § 1 et seq.
Dismissal of plaintiff's action as entitling
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit defendant to recover attorneys' fees or costs as
§§ 6 to 86.
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66
AJL.R. — Time when voluntary nonsuit or A.L.R.3d 1087.
dismissal may be taken as of right under statPropriety of termination of properly initiated
ute so authorizing at any time before "trial," derivative action by "independent committee"
"commencement of trial/'"trial of the facts," or appointed by board of directors whose actions
the like, 1 A.L.R.3d 711.
(or inaction) are under attack, 22 A.L.R.4th
Dismissing action or striking testimony 1206.
where party to civil action asserts privilege
Nature of termination of civil action required
against self-incrimination as to pertinent ques- to satisfy element of favorable termination to
tion, 4 A.L.R.3d 545.
support action for malicious prosecution, 30
Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or direction of A.L.R.4th 572.
verdict on opening statement of counsel in civil
What constitutes bringing an action to trial
action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid
Dismissal of action because of party's perjury dismissal under state statute or court rule
requiring such activity within stated time, 32
xr suppression of evidence, 11 A.L.R.3d 1153.
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to A.L.R.4th 840.
imely prosecute action, 15 A.L R.3d 674.
Construction, as to terms and conditions, of
Right of one spouse, over objection, to volun- state statute or rule providing for voluntary
arily dismiss claim for divorce, annulment, or dismissal without prejudice upon such terms
imilar marital relief, 16 A.L.R.3d 283.
and conditions as state court deems proper, 34
Application to period of limitations fixed by A.L.R.4th 778.
ontract, of statute permitting new action to be
Propriety of dismissal under Federal Civil
rought within specified time after failure of Procedure Rule 41(a) of action against less than
rior action for cause other than on the merits, all of several defendants, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 569.
6 A.L.R.3d 452.
Judicial qualification of provision of Rule
Voluntary dismissal of replevin action by 4Kb) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
laintiff as affecting defendant's right to judg- dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply
ment for the return or value of the property, 24 with federal rules or court order, certain other
X.R.3d 768.
dismissals, operates as adjudication upon merWhat amounts to "final submission" or "re- its, 5A.L.R. Fed. 897.
rement of jury" within statute permitting
Propriety of dismissal for failure of prosecu'aintiff to take voluntary dismissal or nonsuit tion under Rule 4Kb) of Federal Rules of Civil
ithout prejudice before submission or retire- Procedure, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 488.

Uile 42. Consolidation; separate trials.
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
*e pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
ie matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
iA ;± T^»oxr T-noiro cnrii r»T-rJorQ rnnrpminp" nrocepdiners therein as may tend to
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(a)(1) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to
the first case filed. Notice of a motion to consolidate cases shall be given to all
parties in each case. The order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in
each case.
(a)(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of the first case
filed shall be used for all subsequent papers and the case shall be heard by the
judge assigned to the first case. The presiding judge may assign the case to
another judge for good cause.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
(Amended effective November 1, 2003.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment added Subdivisions (a)(1) and (2).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 42, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Separate trials ailthorized, U.R.C.R 20(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Condemnation proceedings.
—Separate parcels of land.
Consolidation.
—Adoption proceedings.
— Issue of liability.
— Multiple insurers.
—Unlawful detainer and action to try title.
Divorce.
—Bifurcation.
Separate trials.
—Appeals.
—Court's discretion.
—Separate issues.
Cited.
Condemnation proceedings.
— Separate parcels of land.
Where condemnation proceedings involved
three separate parcels of land belonging to
three separate interests, it was within discretion of trial court to combine cases for trial or to
grant separate trials. Porcupine Reservoir Co.
v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 392
P.2d 620 (1964).
Consolidation.
—Adoption proceedings.
The trial court properly consolidated two
adoption petitions regarding the same children
into one adoption proceeding. L.S.C. v. State,
1999 UT App 315, 991 P2d 70.
—Issue of liability.
It was within discretion of trial court to order
a consolidation, for trial of issue of liability, of
eleven actions involving nineteen plaintiffs
where the order did not violate any constitutional or statutory provision nor was likely to
be prejudicial to defendants. Raggenbuck v.
Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 327, 325 R2d 258 (1958).
— Multiple i n s u r e r s .
Actions by plaintiff against five different insurance companies to recover loss and damage

idated since the several policies were separate
contracts, and actions were not between same
parties; but consolidation was not prejudicial
error where no substantial right of any defendant was affected. New York Jobbing House v.
Sterling Fire Ins. Co., 54 lAah 394, 182 P. 361
(1919).
^—Unlawful detainer and action to try title.
Plaintiff's motion in unlawful detainer proceeding that such proceeding and equitable
action to try title brought by defendant be
joined was properly overruled, since defendant
had right to have issues in unlawful detainer
proceeding tried by jury, which might not have
been the case if actions were tried together.
Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304, 237 P. 217
(1925).
Divorce.
—Bifurcation.
Bifurcation did not prejudice a husband
where, although the initial decree gave wife
sole access to funds in eight bank accounts that
she controlled, at the time of distribution the
court could still equitably divide all assets
owned by the parties at the time the initial
decree was entered. Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d
565 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
Separate trials.
-^Appeals.
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.P 54(b), applies when the trial court orders a separate
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, and failure to have the case
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
issues and parties before that court, will deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an
appeal. First Sec. Bank v CnnM* sni T>O * —
(Utah 1991).
A
—Court's discretion.
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t h e trial court and, absent abuse of such discretion, will not be upset on appeal King v
Barron, 770 P2d 975 (Utah 1988)
—Separate issues.
When a court considers it convenient or desirable in the interest of justice, an> separate
issue may be tried separately Page v Utah
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Home Fire Ins Co, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P2d
290 (1964)
Cited in Lignell v Berg, 593 P2d 800 (Utah
1979), Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd v
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs , Inc, 889 P2d 445
(Utah Ct App 1994), Stevensen v Goodson,
924 P2d 339 (Utah 1996)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of FedJ u r y Formats and Civil Litigation Arnold v
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions in\ olvEastern Airlines, 1991 B YU L Rev 1005
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am Jur 2d Actions § 110 mg patents and copyrights, 79 A L R Fed 532
et seq , 75 Am Jur 2d Trial § 115 et seq
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to
C.J.S. — 1 C J S Actions §§ 109,117 to 122, liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed88 C J S Trial §§ 6 to 10
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in contract acA.L.R. — Propriety of separate trials of is- tions, 79 A L R Fed 812
sues of tort liability and of validity and effect of
Propriety of ordering consolidation under
release, 4 A L R 3d 456
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to in civil rights actions, 81 A L R Fed 732
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of FedPropnety of ordering consolidation under
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv- Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ing personal injury, death, or property damage, m actions involving patents, copyrights, or
78 A L R. Fed 890
trademarks, 82 A L R Fed 719
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to
Propriety of ordering consolidation under
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed- Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in civil rights in actions involving securities, 83 A L R Fed
actions, 79 A L R Fed 220
367

Rule 43. Evidence.
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in
open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of
Evidence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be admitted which is
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the
Supreme Court.
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of
record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on
oral testimony or depositions
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 43(a) and (e), F R C P
Cross-References,
— Evidence generally
§ 78-25-2 et seq

Relevancy and its limits, U R E 401 to 411
Witnesses, U R E 601 to 615

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Form
—Open court
Judge's request for investigation
Motions
—Evidentiary hearing
Witnesses
Cited
Form.
—Open court.
Judge's request for investigation.
Failure of judge in divorce action to notify

ment of Subdivision (a), that all testimony be in
open court, to such a degree as to warrant a
retrial Austad v Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269
P2d 284 (1954)
Motions.
—Evidentiary hearing.
Although a court can grant or deny a motion
on the sole or combined bases of affidavits,
depositions or oral testimony, when no depositions have been taken and disputed material
facts are alleged in opposing affidavits, there
should be an evidentiary hearing to aid m the

Rule 4-106
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Statement of the Rule:
(1) In civil law and motion matters, except orders to showr cause and bench
warrants, matters may be continued upon stipulation of the parties and notice
to the clerk of the judge to whom the case is assigned, except that when a
matter has been placed upon the official law and motion calendar, the matter
may be continued only upon approval of the court.
(2) In sexual abuse cases involving minor victims, continuances may be
granted upon a written finding by the court, or written minute entry which
shall include the reason(s) for the continuance.
(3) A motion to continue made on or within 10 daj^s prior to the date of a
hearing may be granted by the court upon a showing of good cause and upon
such conditions as the court determines to be just, including but not limited to
the payment of costs and attorney fees.
(4) If the hearing is an "important criminal justice hearing" or an "important
juvenile justice hearing" as defined by § 77-38-2 of which the victim has
requested notification, the court should consider the impact of the continuance
upon the victim.
(Amended effective November 15, 1995.)

Rule 4-106. Electronic conferencing.
Intent:
To authorize the use of electronic conferencing in lieu of personal appearances in appropriate cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In the judge's discretion, any hearing may be conducted using telephone
or video conferencing.
(2) Any proceeding in which a person appears by telephone or video
conferencing shall proceed as required in any other hearing including keeping
a verbatim record.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)

Rule 4-107. Consolidation of cases.
Intent:
To provide a procedure for hearing motions to consolidate cases and for the
consolidation of cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to civil and criminal proceedings in all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Motions to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to
either the lowest numbered or the first filed case.
(2) Notice of a motion to consolidate shall be given to all parties in each
action involved, and a copy shall be filed in each case involved. The order
denying or granting the motion shall also be filed in each file involved.
(3) In the event a motion to consolidate is granted, the order shall specify
the case number under which all future papers shall be filed, which shall be the
lowest of the case numbers involved. Thereafter, that number shall be used
exclusively for all papers filed, and such papers shall be filed only in the
designated case file.
(4) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case shall be heard by the judge
who was assigned to the lowest numbered of the cases involved, except that for
good cause shown the presiding judge may assign the case to another judge.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
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ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A)16A.L.R.5th 1.
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to
modify foreign child custody decree under
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parent a f Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2Xb) and 1738A(f Kl), 67
A.L.R.5th 1.
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1)
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris-

78-45c-102,

diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping
Prevention
Act
(PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A.
§§ 1738A(cX2)(A)
and
1738A(f)(l),
72
A.L.R.5th 249.
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185.
Appealability of interlocutory or pendente
lite order for temporary child custody, 82
A.L.R.5th 389.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married.
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or
parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent,
temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue.
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse,
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The
term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement.
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to
establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination.
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or
a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case
of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination
concerning a particular child.
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter.
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determination is made.
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes,
replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination
concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that
made the previous determination.
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
842
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(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent,
who:
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for
a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence,
within one year immediately before the commencement of a child
custody proceeding; and
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to
legal custody under the law of this state.
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a
child.
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village
which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing
law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-102, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 2; 2001, ch. 255, § 36.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par-

ent-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (3) and
(4).
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Custody proceeding.
Voluntary termination of adoptive father's
parental rights in, and obligations to, child was

not custody issue under this chapter. TB. v.
M.M.J., 908 R2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
78 A.L.R.4th 1028.

78-45c-103. Proceedings governed by other law.
This chapter does not govern:
(1) an adoption proceeding; or
(2) a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical
care for a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-103, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-104. Application to Indian tribes,
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in
t h e Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this
chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for
purposes of Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2, Jurisdiction.
(3) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this
843
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electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum
or an electronic record made by a court after the communication.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-110, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, 8 10.

78-45c-lll.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

Taking testimony in another state.

(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in
another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or
other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon
which the testimony is taken.
(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of
this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not
be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-lll, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 11.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-112. Cooperation between courts — Preservation
of records.
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state
to:
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing;
(b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that
state;
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a
child involved in a pending proceeding;
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of
the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any
evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having
physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without
the child.
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may:
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1); or
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a
custody proceeding in another state.
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request under
Subsection (2)(b) upon assurance by the other state that travel and other
necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has
physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it
846
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shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may
be by publication if other means are not effective.
(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this
state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-108, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 8.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,

§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.
Cross-References. — Service of process,
Rule 4, U.R.C.R

78-45c-109. Appearance and limited immunity.
(1) A party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under Part 2, Jurisdiction,
a party in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination under Part 2,
Jurisdiction, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child
custody determination under Part 3, Enforcement, may appear and participate
in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for
another proceeding or purpose.
(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being
physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this
chapter. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis
other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this
state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another
state, service of process allowable under the laws of that state may be
accomplished in this state.
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter
committed by an individual while present in this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-109, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 9.

78-45c-110.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

Communication between courts.

(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter.
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall
be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision
on jurisdiction is made.
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records,
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need
not be made of that communication.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication
and granted access to the record.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record'' means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or
transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the
courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an
845
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appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state.
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under
Subsections (1) and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the
law of this state.
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child
custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall
forward a certified copy of these records.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-112, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

PART 2
JURISDICTION
7S-45e-20L

Initial child custody jurisdiction,

(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state;
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection
(l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum
under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one
parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under
Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child
custody determination by a court of this state.
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody determination.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-201, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 13.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.
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78-45c-202

JUDICIAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appropriate forum.
Concurrent jurisdiction.
Preferred forum.
Appropriate forum.
Utah district court appropriately retained
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act to make any determinations regarding custody, visitation or other
matters relevant to the children, where the
parents were divorced in Utah and, although
the mother had taken the children to Washington, that state specifically declined to exercise
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present
involvement with the matter. Rawiings v.
Weiner, 752 R2d 1327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
This chapter does not give a preference to the
"home state." The significant connection or substantial connection basis comes into play either
when the home state test cannot be met or as
an alternative to that test. In re W.D. v. Drake,
770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Even though a certain state may be the
"home state," if the child and his family have
equal or stronger ties with another state that
other state also has jurisdiction. In re W.D. v.
Drake, 770 R2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 789 R2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding
that California was the more appropriate and
convenient forum to litigate custody and in
granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat-

ural parents' petition, where substantial information concerning the parents' abilities and
past history was in California, the mother had
only recently come to Utah but had lived for
years in California, and the parents'purpose in
coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 789 P2d 33 (Utah 1989).
The state that made the original custody
determination has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the custody issue until that state
loses or declines to exercise its jurisdiction.
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
Concurrent jurisdiction.
Utah had concurrent jurisdiction to modify a
child custody order from another state when it
was in the best interest of the child for Utah to
assume jurisdiction because the child and at
least one parent had a significant connection
with Utah and there was substantive evidence
in Utah pertaining to the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P..2d 157 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Preferred forum.
In child custody matters, continuing jurisdiction of court in which divorce decree originated
is intended to remain exclusive, even if other
states have come to satisfy one or more of the
criteria of this section, unless the decree state
decides not to exercise it. Liska v. Liska, 902
P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Significant connection jurisdiction
of court under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(B), 5 A.L.R.5th 550.
Abandonment and emergency jurisdiction of
court under § 3(a)(3) of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
USCS § 1738(c)(2)(C), 5 A.L.R.5th 788.

Home state jurisdiction of court under
§ 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A
(c)(2)(A), 6A.L.R.5th 1.
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(D), 6
A.L.R.5th 69.

78-45e-202. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state
that has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 78-45c201 or 78-45c-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and
one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant
848
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(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state
that would assume jurisdiction;
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume
jurisdiction;
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the
pending litigation, including the testimony of the child;
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously
and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of
the pending litigation.
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition
the court considers just and proper.
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other
proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-207, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 19.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204 or by other law of
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a
person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the
exercise of jurisdiction;
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections
78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203 determines that this state is a more
appropriate forum under Section 78-45c-207; or
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201
through 78-45c-203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to
Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203.
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it shall charge the party
invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees,
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the
award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this
chapter.
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Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations

(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h)
of this section, any custody determination or visitation determination made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State.
(b) As used in this section, the term-(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child;
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a
court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary
orders, and initial orders and modifications;
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time
involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as
parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less
than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of
such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as
part of the six-month or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made
subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation determination concerning the same
child, whether made by the same court or not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has
physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court
or claims a right to custody;
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child;
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States;
and
(9) "visitation determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a
court providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and
temporary orders and initial orders and modifications.
(c) A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is
consistent with the provisions of this section only if-(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and

14

(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within
six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child
is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or
for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court
of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the
child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State
other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available in
such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has
been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody or visitation of the child, and
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court assume
jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of
this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody or
visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this section
continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section
continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any
contestant.
(e) Before a child custody or visitation determination is made, reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent
whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person who has
physical custody of a child.
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination ot the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if-(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a
custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a
proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is
exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make
a custody determination.
(h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation determination made by a court
of another State unless the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction
to modify such determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify
such determination.
HISTORY:
(Added Dec. 2 8 , 1980, P.L. 96-611, § 8 ( a ) , 94 Stat. 3569.)
(As amended Nov.
12, 1998, P.L. 105-374, § 1, 112 Stat. 3383; Oct. 28, 2000,
P.L. 106-386, Div B, Title III, § 1303(d), 114 Stat. 1512.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 034700173
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Plaintiff,
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VIDEOTAPED TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
MARK ALLEN SULLIVAN,
Defendant.

Judge Darwin C. Hansen
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Sullivan

v. Sullivan

1|
2 |

*

January

8,

2 0 04

P R O C E E D I N G S
JUDGE HANSEN:

Case of Wendy Sullivan against Mark

3 I Allen Sullivan, an action has been filed both in Judge Vaughn's
4

court and in my court, and thatfs the purpose of our phone call.

5

And Judge Vaughn, as I understand it, you have entered an order of

6

temporary custody which was filed December 31st of 2003.

7

JUDGE VAUGHN: Right.

8

JUDGE HANSEN:

And this court --

9

JUDGE VAUGHN:

There are actually two orders here.

10

The petitioner here, who would be the respondent in your court,

11

Mark Sullivan, appeared here for an ex parte emergency hearing on

12

December the 3 0th, and that order was entered.

13

an ex parte order, we set a new hearing, which is required under

14

Illinois law to be set within 10 days of an ex parte hearing.

15

JUDGE HANSEN: Right.

16

JUDGE VAUGHN:

And because it was

With notice to the other party.

We

17

held a hearing then on January the 5th.

18

Wendy Sullivan, she signed for a notice as petitioner here, sent

19

her a notice by Federal Express that indicates that she signed for

20

it on January the 2nd at 9:34 a.m.

21

second hearing here, and I issued a second order granting

22

temporary custody to Mark Sullivan here on January the 5th.

23

order was filed today.

24

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

After giving notice to

She received her notice of the

That

So -- and what's happened in our

25 I court is that --in fact, let me -- let me indicate to you the
2
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history, and maybe you'll understand -JUDGE VAUGHN:

2
3

v.

I have it.

I think the petitioner here,!

attached copies of transcripts from an August...

4

JUDGE HANSEN:

Hearing.

5

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Hearing, and November the 13th hearing.

6

JUDGE HANSEN:

And the November 13th hearing was

7

before the commissioner, and the August hearing I think was before

8

me.

9

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Correct.

10

JUDGE HANSEN:

Now, as I understand it, complaint --

11

as I understand it, Miss Sullivan left Illinois on June the 20th

12

of the year 2002.

She came to Utah.

13

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

14

JUDGE HANSEN:

When she came to Utah, she then filed a

15

complaint in Utah on July the 26th of this year.

16

the six months, and clearly the home state at that point would

17

have been Illinois.

I think there's no question.

18

JUDGE VAUGHN:

19

JUDGE HANSEN:

20 I happened to it.

That was within

(Inaudible.)

That complaint sat, and nothing

Then on July 28th, '03, this would have been

21

approximately seven months later, she, with a different lawyer,

22

filed a second complaint.

23

that particular matter an answer was filed by Mr. King here in

24

Utah on behalf of Mr. Sullivan, and he raised the jurisdiction

25

issue.

That's outside the six months.

And in

And he also raised the jurisdiction issue in the first
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1 I complaint to which he filed an answer.
2

JUDGE VAUGHN: (Unintelligible.)

3

JUDGE HANSEN:

After that happened, then it's my

4

understanding, and maybe you can help me, on April the 7th of '03,

5

Mr. Sullivan for the first time filed an action in Illinois.

6

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Correct.

7

JUDGE HANSEN:

Which would have been approximately 10

8

months.

9

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

10

JUDGE HANSEN:

11

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

12

JUDGE HANSEN:

13

complaint, made a motion.

14

JUDGE VAUGHN:

15

After she came to Utah.

Then new counsel, who filed the second

She filed an answer here and the

general appearance here.

16

JUDGE HANSEN:

17

JUDGE VAUGHN: (Unintelligible.)

18

-- 16th.

Wendy

Sullivan did.

19
20

Okay.

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

So Wendy has filed an answer

there and he's filed an answer out here.

21

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Yes. His answer there contested

22

jurisdiction, her answer here was a general appearance and did

23

not --

24 I

JUDGE HANSEN:

Uh-huh.

25 I

JUDGE VAUGHN:

-- did not contest jurisdiction per se,

19
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1

but she did make reference that she had a case pending out there

2

as well.

3

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

4

JUDGE VAUGHN:

She filed her answer here May the 7th

5

without counsel.

6

She filed it pro se.

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

I was not aware of that. The

7

matter came before me in August on a motion to consolidate the two

8

Utah cases; that's what the dad wanted, Mr. Sullivan.

9

wanted to dismiss the July case because jurisdiction was

The wife

10

inappropriate.

11

July 28th, '03 here, which would be outside the six months and, as

12

I understand the statute, then Utah would be the home state. That

13

order was issued by the Court.

14

you're correct.

15

domestic relations commissioner, and a temporary order then I

16

think was entered on November the 13th of this year.

17

And that was granted, leaving the complaint filed

I -- the hearing was August,

And then this matter proceeded before our

That's where we are, and I was just -- what I was

18

wondering is if you were aware of the fact that the first finding

19

in Illinois was April the 7th, '03, which is some 10 months after

20

she left Illinois?

21

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I wasn't.

22

transcripts of our hearing.

23

here.

And wish I had the

We kept a record of both hearings

24

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

25

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I expressed concern about that, that he
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1

didn't do anything for 10 months. We had evidence presented here,

2

I'm not sure if you had evidence presented there or just had

3

arguments of counsel, but he took the stand here and testified

4

that his wife kept telling him that she would be home, then she

5

didn't come home.

6

see her. And her family told him he'd be arrested if he didn't

7

leave.

8

Christmas; she didn't come home at Christmas.

9

counsel, who recommended he file an action here.

Then he went out there and was not allowed to

Then he testified that she told him she'd be home by
He then sought
And although

10

that troubled me that he waited 10 months, allowed the other state

11

to gain home state status, under the UCCJA.

12

what I hung my order on was that while the issue was still pending

13

and still had jurisdiction, he filed here, he filed here and she

14

filed a general appearance; jurisdiction had never been decided

15

out there.

He also argued, and

16

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

17

JUDGE VAUGHN:

His attorney argued that since Illinois

18

was the home state till some other state took over jurisdiction or

19

Illinois declined jurisdiction, that Illinois was still the home

20

state.

21

appearance here and an answer here in May, before your August

22

hearing; she agreed by that that Illinois was the home state and

I took the position that she had filed a general

23 iIllinois had jurisdiction until we declined.
24
25

JUDGE HANSEN:

Uh-huh.

Well, I can see -- I can see

the problem, and I was not aware of the answer that she filed pro
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When I -- when I heard the case in August, I offered for the

2

attorney for Mr. Sullivan to put Mrs. Sullivan en the stand for

3

purpose of some testimony.

4

necessary because Mr. Sullivan was not here to listen.

5

received from her lawyer a proffer, which in effect said that when

6

she went to Utah, he knew where she was going, and that in fact he

7

knew how to get in touch with her, and that she was not trying to

8

keep the children from him in any regard.

9

factual issue, and I don't think we can resolve it at this point,

He indicated he didn't feel that was
So I

But you know, that's a

10

but I wondered if we could talk about the jurisdiction issue and

11

maybe come to some arrangement.

12

attorneys will just have to work it out, frankly.

13

what the options are, but they'll have to figure it out.

14

And if we can, then I guess the j
I don't know

I took the position, because the second complaint was

15

filed in January of '03, which was seven to eight months after she

16

came to Utah, and he filed an answer in Utah to all aspects of the

17

complaint, although he based in his affirmative defense the

18

jurisdiction issue, and dad didn't file anything in Illinois until

19

April the 7th, '03, that Utah then would be the home state, and

20 ;therefore jurisdiction was proffered to proceed with the case.
21

And indeed it has proceeded here with a temporary order to include

22

a temporary custody.

23

have jurisdiction over all aspects of the divorce, perhaps with

24

the exception of custody.

25

JUDGE VAUGHN:
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there three months to get jurisdiction for divorce; is that right?

2

JUDGE HANSEN:

That's right, but --

3

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Here you have to live here 90 days,

4

which is true, but you also have to have been separated six months

5

before you can get a no fault divorce here.

6

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

7

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Ninety days jurisdictional --

8

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well, it's jurisdictional here too in

9

terms of the 90 days, but we don't have the requirement that they

10

have to be separated for six months.

But what I was going by was

11

not that, but it was the six months under the Uniform Act to

12

determine whether or not it was the home state or whether she had

13

been gone for six months and in another state for six months or

14

more, and therefore that state would become the home state. I

15

could see --

16

JUDGE VAUGHN:

17

look at the statute here.

18

challenged jurisdiction there, and that had never been ruled on,

19

so he was not aware he had to file something here until -- I don't

20

know if that's right or not, but he was not aware he had to file

21

something here until Utah dismissed her case for lack of

22

jurisdiction on the custody issue; and second, that she had misled

23

him, although he knew where she was. She first told him she was

24

going to a family reunion, she didn't return, and told him because

25

his family was there, another family had come in, and then she

-- argue two things.

I'm trying to

The first was that he had --he had

8
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told him she was going to come home for Christmas.

2

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

3

JUDGE VAUGHN:

And based on her misleading him, she

4
5

should not be awarded.

There's a -- I can't find a --

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah, I don't know if the word

6

"surreptitious" is used or not, but at least that's what was

7

talked about in that case.

8

surreptitious leaving from one state to go to the other state,

9

whatever the definition of that word is in terms of the factual

And I think if indeed there's a

10

predicate to support that finding of fact and conclusion.

11

say, out here I had a proffer from her, and his lawyer did not

12

want to do any cross-examination of her on that issue. And so my

13

only alternative was to accept that proffer.

14

fact that he hadn't filed until 10 months after she left the

Like I

And because of the

15 J state, then I ruled that Utah had jurisdiction under the Act
16 J because it was more than six months.
17

Now, it may be that he could say well, you know, I

18

didn't know I should have filed.

But on the other hand, if under

19

the circumstances he had counsel back there -- and I don't know if

20

he had counsel or not -- the six months becomes particularly

21

critical, and you would assume that he would have seen fit to

22

issue --to file, because if he didn't, and Utah is deemed to have

23

jurisdiction, that's to his disadvantage, apparently.

24

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Right.

25

JUDGE HANSEN:

If he does file within the six months,
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1 I it's clear that Utah does not have jurisdiction, because for that
2 | six-month period of time Illinois would be the home state. So
3 I anyway, we -- we -- I -- it looks like we have a tiger by the
4 I tail.
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

7
8

JUDGE HANSEN:

And I wanted to call and --

JUDGE VAUGHN:

A special setting right before

Christmas to hear this.

9

JUDGE HANSEN:

I know, yeah.

And --

10

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Let me ask you two other questions.

11

JUDGE HANSEN: Sure.

12

JUDGE VAUGHN:

In our statute, under our statute,

13

which is 750, Illinois Compiled Statutes Act 35, Section 4, talks

14

about jurisdiction.

15

JUDGE HANSEN: Right.

16

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Section 4, section 4(d) talks about a

17

court, having once attained jurisdiction, retains it until it

18

concedes it to another state.

19

jurisdiction at the time she filed her first one.

20

pleadings on file attacking that.

21

second one after the six months, but before any rulings had been

22

made about who had jurisdiction.

23

had jurisdiction because we hadn't conceded it to some other

24

state.

25

He was arguing that Illinois had

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.
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And while we still had jurisdiction

2 J before your ruling in August, she filed her general appearance
3

here, which confirms jurisdiction here.

4

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

5

JUDGE VAUGHN:

But as the first question.

Second, our^

6

statute says that no matter which state has jurisdiction, another

7

state can decline jurisdiction if a different state is the more

8

appropriate to hear it. And I was wondering, with him having

9

lived here and having attended school here initially, if the

10

witnesses who --in Illinois a major factor in who gets custody is

11

who was the primary caretaker, who took them to school, attended

12

meetings, took them to the doctor, that kind of stuff.

13

Illinois be the more appropriate forum to hear that evidence about

14

who was the primary caretaker when they were still together.

15

JUDGE HANSEN:

Would

In answer to your first question -- I'm

16

not sure I know the answer, but let me just make an observation.

17

I think within the first six months there's no question Illinois

18

has jurisdiction, if it's invoked.

19

the home state during the period of the six months under the

20

statute, and it isn't invoked, and then you're living somewhere

\

But if there's no filing in

21

else for six months-plus in another state, but the father does not

22

invoke the jurisdiction of Illinois, then I'm not sure that one

23

could conclude that Illinois had jurisdiction and that Utah

24

attempted to usurp it.

25

party invokes it, and that's why that the filing of April 7,

One may have jurisdiction, but unless the
'03
11

I
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But I understand exactly

2 I where I thought Illinois was coming from.

My thought when I made

3

the order was, as I've indicated, that I think he had an

4

obligation to invoke the jurisdiction.

5

seems to me that you can't file then in April and say Illinois

6

then had jurisdiction, because it wasn't invoked initially by the

7

party.

8
9

And by not invoking it, it

With regard to the other key question you raised, the
other issue, and I think it's a good issue, and I think for you

10

and me it's probably the most important, aside from the

11

jurisdiction issue, we got a dad, and I guess his family, that

12

lives in your area, we got a mother and her family that lives in

13

Utah.

14

can't -- and you know, frankly, I don't remember if they've been

15

in school or not.

We've got a situation where there are two children.

16
17

And I

Do you recall that?

JUDGE VAUGHN:

They were attending school here in

Thompsonville, which was outside the county.

18

JUDGE HANSEN:

Were they in school in Utah, so that

19

now when they went back for the Christmas vacation they had to

20

change schools?

21

JUDGE VAUGHN:

22

Yes, they had to re-enroll in

Thompsonville School here again.

23

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well, and I think they lived there -- I

24

don't know how long they lived in your county, in Hamilton County,

25

but I think it was for a couple of years, maybe more, and she's
12
L
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1 I been out here for about -- about 18 months, and we got the kids i
2 | school out here.

So, you know, it's hard to say which is the mos

3 I appropriate forum non conveniens.

One might be guided by the

4

Child Custody Jurisdiction Act when they say that jurisdiction fo

5

the home state purposes is for a period of six months.

6

it's outside the six months, then they say no, then you look at --

7

you look at the circumstances that existed.

8

guideline, then back in Illinois we're talking about two-plus

9

years ago, whereas in Utah you're talking about the last 18

If indeed

If six months is the

10

months, except for, you know, I think the kids went back to see

11

him for Christmas, but I don't remember the details about that.

12

So the forum non conveniens issue is a hard one for me to

13

evaluate.

14

What do you think?
JUDGE VAUGHN:

Well, I'm not sure I -- I don't

15

particularly want the case; I'd like it to be your case.

But I

16

also think, even if the case is here, I frankly cannot imagine him*

17

getting custody because -- and I haven't heard the evidence, but

18

what little I did hear the other day was he has children from a

19

previous marriage that he does not have custody of.

20

JUDGE HANSEN:

That's what I understand.

21

JUDGE VAUGHN:

And so I can't imagine he was ever the

22

primary caretaker even of these new children.

But when they were

23

together as husband and wife -- and wife here in Illinois, I would

24

expect the (unintelligible) to be that she was the primary

25 J caretaker and she will still get custody, even here.
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1 I

JUDGE HANSEN:

Right.

2

JUDGE VAUGHN:

But since theyfve been -- since they've

3

been out there, I don't think he's going to have a fairer shot to

4

even say --he obviously wasn't the primary caretaker, because she

5

took the children and left -- left the state and went to stay

6

someplace else, so he obviously wasn't the primary caretaker

7

there.

8
9

JUDGE HANSEN:

One thing -- one thing is clear.

If

indeed we were --if indeed we're unable to resolve it cost-wise,

10

attorneys' fees and otherwise, and if indeed both parties are

11

intent on custody, then at least in Utah there would be a custody |

12

evaluation.

13

and the parties are from two different states, and sometimes you

14

have to get an evaluator in both states and have that evaluator in

15

each state interview the parties in that state to include the

16

parties and/or the children, and maybe third parties if it's

17

appropriate.

18

with one another, and maybe they can come up with a joint

19

recommendation, and maybe they can't, but that doubles the cost

20

appreciably.

21

could just kind of put the emotion behind them and let these

22

lawyers guide and direct them, and if they could find some common

23

ground, with the thought in mind of what's the best interests of

24

the children, both of these parties are better off.

25

I then -- I've presided over cases where that happens

And then have the two custodial evaluators confer

I think you and I would both agree if these parties

One thing clear is that whoever has custody, there
14
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1

needs to be some sort of visitation arrangement, with the costs of

2

travel allocated in an appropriate kind of way so that these

3

children have contact and relationship with both mom and dad.

4

And.
JUDGE VAUGHN:

Let me raise one other issue.

As I

6 | understand it, he has appealed rulings of Utah -7 I

JUDGE HANSEN;

He has, that's true.

He has

JUDGE VAUGHN:

If Illinois declines to exercise

8 I appealed -9
10

jurisdiction or concede the point at this time while an appeal is

11

pending, the Utah court may very well move to a higher tribunal

12

out there at the appellate court level to determine -- they may

13

send it back out here or may determine it should stay out there

14

and --

15

JUDGE HANSEN:

And I don't know what they'll do, but

16

they have appealed.

17

court of appeals, it's not the Supreme Court.

18

can't verify this, but I understand that the notice of appeal's

19

been filed and the gathering documents and getting the necessary

20

transcripts.

21

will be, I'm told, and then you got the response for brief, and

22

then it will be set for hearing, and then we'll get an argument.

23

I don't know how long that will take.

24

knows?

25 j

And at this point it goes to the intermediate
I'm told, and I

The appellate brief has not yet been filed, but soon

JUDGE VAUGHN:

It could be months. Who

We have three competing -15
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JUDGE HANSEN:

I know.

JUDGE VAUGHN:

-- policy questions here, like here,

3

that's the cases that are supposed to take priority and be heard

4

on an expedited basis and that type of thing, but when you have

5

something on appeal, even an expedited appeal takes several

6

months.

7

JUDGE HANSEN:

Right, right.

8

JUDGE VAUGHN:

You used the phrase coming into it, he

9

didn't invoke his Illinois jurisdiction here, and I felt the same

10

thing when we had our ex parte hearing here.

11

however, argued that language of the statute is -- does not

12

require him to invoke anything; that Illinois has jurisdiction

13

until another state determines it has jurisdiction or Illinois

14

cedes jurisdiction.

15

here until Utah decided that -- Utah had not decided until August

16

the 7th, and he filed it here.

17

jurisdiction Illinois already had, that argument.

You were saying he didn't have to do anything

JUDGE HANSEN:

18

His attorney,

That sort of confirms the

Well, I understand, I understand that

19

argument.

My only thought would be that the fact of the matter is

20

if nothing's filed in the first six months in Illinois, then on

21

the seven months, during the seventh month or the eighth month,

22

and she files in Utah, given the language of the Uniform Child

23

Custody Jurisdiction Act, it's outside the six months.

24

that Act, as I understand it, Utah would have -- would presume

25

would have jurisdiction.

And under

And I don't know how counsel could argue
16
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1

that by Utah filing in January of '01, and him filing in Illinois

2

on April the 7th, '03, that Utah then in August of '03 would not <

3 , be in a position to rule on the jurisdiction issue.

Because

clearly the complaint, the second complaint filed in Utah was
5

outside the six months.

6

notwithstanding that, Illinois had jurisdiction, even though it's

7

outside the six months, theoretically, if it's outside the six

8

months, another state could never take jurisdiction until that

9

state conferred with Illinois.

10

And if counsel was saying, well,

And at that time who do you confer

with if there's no claim filed?

11

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Right.

12

JUDGE HANSEN:

In other words, up until April the 7th

13

of '03, who does counsel call or who does the Court call to see if

14

Illinois is going to waive jurisdiction or assume jurisdiction?

15

It isn't even filed in the court there.

16

think invoking the jurisdiction becomes a critical issue.

17

JUDGE VAUGHN:

That's why I'm saying I

He filed when Utah did not have

18

jurisdiction, so Illinois is still the home state.

19

statute says the home state maintains jurisdiction until something

20

else happens.

21

petition, so that's still pending.

22

And the

But there had never been any ruling on her first

JUDGE HANSEN:

Oh, okay, let me -- let me -- maybe --

23

maybe this isn't clear.

Let me -- let me give you the scenario

24

that had occurred here.

The first complaint in Utah was filed

25

July 26th, '02.
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1 I that time, because it!s only a month after she got here. An
2 | answer was filed to that complaint December the 27th, '02. Okay?
3 I

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Okay.

I have a copy of that.

4

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

Then a second complaint was

5

filed July 28th, f03, and that's the one I've been talking about.

6

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

7

JUDGE HANSEN:

An answer was filed --

8

JUDGE VAUGHN:

January 2 8th, »03.

9

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah, January 2 8th, '03, and then an

10

answer was filed for that one.

11

Illinois April 7th, '03. Then --

12

Then he filed a petition in

JUDGE VAUGHN:

When was he served with the second

14

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well --

15

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Do you know that?

16

JUDGE HANSEN:

-- I could look that up.

13

complaint?

17

I've got the file right here.

18

counsel accepted the service.

19

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Let me see.

He had counsel, and it may be that

I don't think they did.

That was one

20

of his arguments here, that although he had counsel, they didn't

21

serve counsel, they had him re-served all over again.

22

JUDGE HANSEN:

They may have done.

I can tell you

23

that that -- if he was re-served all over again, that service

24

would have been after January 2 8th, *03. They're not challenging

25 J service -- jurisdiction based on service at all.
1O
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I'm saying that if he wasn't served and

2 | didn't know there was a new case pending at the time he filed his
3 I case here, and actually he would have still thought he was
4

operating under her first Utah filing that did not have

5 J jurisdiction.
6 |

8

Well.

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I don't know if it matters what he

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well, that's -- that's a fair question,

thought.

9
10

JUDGE HANSEN:

does it matter what he thought.

The answer was filed...

11

JUDGE VAUGHN:

April 28th, I think.

12

JUDGE HANSEN:

No, no.

13

copy of the answer.

Well, wait a minute.

I got a

The answer was filed April the 18th.

Well --

14

JUDGE VAUGHN:

After he had filed here.

15

JUDGE HANSEN:

It was signed by counsel April the

17

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Okay.

18

JUDGE HANSEN:

And he filed there April the 7th.

19

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

20

JUDGE HANSEN:

16

18th.

Correct.

Now, when was he served?

21

don't see that.

22

complaint?

23

in the file.

24

represents Mr. Sullivan, has made an issue of that; at least

25

before me he hasn't.

I

When was -- when was he served with the second

I cannot answer that. And it may be the return is not
But I don't think that local counsel, Mr. King, who

So I wish I could give that date to you, but
1 Q
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I'm sorry.
So about what happened was, I think -- I don't know

3

who filed it for the defendant on April 7th; probably Illinois

4

counsel.

5

don't know if Mr. King is the one here in Utah that filed it or if

6

it was Illinois counsel who filed the emergency petition during

7

the * Christmastime.

I don't know if you folks have reciprocity or not, and I

8

JUDGE VAUGHN:

That was his counsel here.

9

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

Well, all right. And I don't

10

know when that counsel was retained or I don't know when --

11

whether or not that counsel ever talked to Utah counsel, I'm not

12

sure.

13

I don't -- I'm not privy to that -JUDGE VAUGHN:

I think counsel here must be talking to

14

his -- Mr. Sullivan's counsel in Utah, because when they filed

15

their emergency pleading here, they had attached to it an appendix

16

with Exhibits A through K.

17

JUDGE HANSEN:

Probably so.

18

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Of all of your pleadings, transcripts,

19
20

,

and orders out there.
JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay, well, I'm sure there's contact

21

then. And counsel -- and there's no question Mr. King out here

22

believes the Court committed error when I dismissed the first case

23

and didn't simply consolidate the two cases. And the reason that

24

Mr. King was concerned is because of the implication that it had,

25 J I think, on jurisdiction.
20
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The reason I did what I did is because as of this

2

filing of the second complaint, it was outside the six months, in

3

fact, it was approaching seven, maybe beyond seven, and nothing

4

was filed in Illinois until April the 7th.

5

the case back then -- because clearly the second case is outside

And -- and I thought

6 I the six months -7 |

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

8 |

JUDGE HANSEN:

9

-- turned on the issue of whether or

not she was improperly removing the children from the jurisdiction

10

and away from her husband.

11

I said to Mr. King, "Do you wish to cross-examine or examine Mrs.

12

Sullivan?"

13

listen."

14

based on the proffer from her lawyer in Utah," and that was she

15

came here with him knowing it, she moved in with her parents, and

16

he knew how to get in touch with her, and she decided to stay

17

here, and let him know about it, and there was nothing

18

surreptitious or under the table to try to get one up on the other

19

parent in the case. At least based on the proffer, that's what it

20

appeared to me.

21

Utah had jurisdiction and there was no need to contact the

22

Illinois court.

23

done that, because in April it had been filed in your court, and I

24

should have called you.

25

I received the proffer, and that's why

And he said, "No, because Mr. Sullivan is not here to

And I said, "Well, then all I can do is make a decision

And under the circumstances, that I felt like

I probably would have been well advised to have

JUDGE VAUGHN:

It looks to me like --do you have an
PI

-Garcia

& Love

Reporting

*

801-538-23

36

Sullivan

v.

Sullivan

*

January

8,

1 | April the 11th, 2003 filing in the second case?

2004

It looks like the

2 | summons was filed April the 11th, and he was served March the
3 I 19th, before his filing here.
4

JUDGE HANSEN:

He may have been, he may have been.

5

See, out here, one of the -- the summons was signed January the

6

27th of f03 on the second case.

7

we do it out here, frankly, we have what we call a domestic

8

relations commissioner, and they handle most of the cases in the

9

domestic matter.

In terms of the filing, the way

The only time it's going to get to the judge is

10

if there is not a settlement and itfs got to be tried, or if there

11

is a legal issue that has to be decided.

12

the one that brought the case before me for the first time in

13

August, the two motions, one to consolidate, and the other to

14

dismiss the first case.

15

can see a March 11th case or filing.

16

11th filing was?

And that legal issue is

Ifm looking through the file to see if I
What do you think that March

17

JUDGE VAUGHN:

April the 11th.

18

JUDGE HANSEN:

April 11?

19

JUDGE VAUGHN:

It was filed April 11, was a notation

20

at the (unintelligible) bottom that says --

21
22

25

JUDGE HANSEN:

Oh, the summons indeed was filed April

JUDGE VAUGHN:

And at the bottom of yours, numbers

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

-Garcia

Reporting

11th.

23
24

What do you think the --

843 --

22
& Love

*

801-538-233

37

Sullivan

v. Sullivan

*

January

8,

2004

1 I

JUDGE VAUGHN:

— 1903, 5:20 p.m

2 J

JUDGE HANSEN:

That's right, I got it.

3

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I suspect that's when he was served.

4

JUDGE HANSEN:

You're probably right.

5

I do have that,

the original copy.

6

JUDGE VAUGHN: Right.

7

JUDGE HANSEN:

Which --

8

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Served with even the second case before

9
10
11
12
13
14

he filed here.
JUDGE HANSEN:

That -- yes, if it -- if he was served

in March, that's true, he was served with the second case.
JUDGE VAUGHN:

So I guess the bottom line is where do

we go from here?
JUDGE HANSEN:

I know, and I've thought about that,

15

Judge Vaughn.

I just don't know.

I think there are two general

16

alternatives.

This is what I've come up with:

17

guess one option is that the Illinois orders stamd and the Utah

18

orders stand, and it just reverts back to the lawyers to decide

19

how to untangle the problem.

It -- it -- I

20

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I -- I did --

21

JUDGE HANSEN:

Or maybe based on not the jurisdiction

22

issue but the non -- but the forum conveniens issue, you and I

23

agree that it ought to be venued in your court or in my court, and

24

let the parties proceed.

25 I

JUDGE VAUGHN:
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I don't know how you feel about that.
I did have one other thing that I did

& Love Reporting

*

801 -538 -:

3g

Sullivan

v.

Sullivan

*

January

8,

2 004

l

in my case, because she wasn't here and I knew there was a Utah

2

case, I set this for a status -- although I granted him temporary

3

custody, I set this for a status February 23rd.

4

JUDGE HANSEN: Uh-huh.

5

JUDGE VAUGHN:

One, to allow her more time to make an

6

argument here as to what should happen next.

7

JUDGE HANSEN: Right.

8

JUDGE VAUGHN:

9
10

I guess that's a possibility too, to

leave it as is, with both orders pending, until the 23rd and
maybe --

11

JUDGE HANSEN:

And you and I talk --

12

JUDGE VAUGHN:

--it out by that time.

If not, then

13

one of us could --we could call each other again and determine

14

how to proceed.

15

court to back off and say, Utah, this has been litigated in Utah.

16

The trial I want is now at the appellate level, and that's a

17

better forum of all to determine who has jurisdiction.

And the other thing would be for the Illinois

18

JUDGE HANSEN:

What do you recommend?

19

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I wish she -- did he have counsel out

20

there?

21

there?

He has Mr. King representing him and she has counsel

22

JUDGE HANSEN: Right.

23

JUDGE VAUGHN:

She doesn't have counsel here.

24

JUDGE HANSEN:

That's true.

25

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I'm a little reluctant to force her to
24
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come out here and be pro se.
2

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well, if indeed she needs to come -- or§

3

if indeed that hearing in February occurs, probably, it's up to

4

her and up to her lawyer out here, I think she'd be well advised

5

to have local counsel in Illinois.

6

she would do that, I just don't -- I don't know.

7

counsel in the case, knowing the case, in Utah.

8

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

9

JUDGE HANSEN:

I don't know whether or not
There are two

Now, it may be that the case will say

10

Judge Hansen, you made a mistake, you should not have accepted

11

jurisdiction.

12

jurisdiction and let Utah proceed in a forum non conveniens

13

theory, in terms of the electio issue, the Utah appeal could still

14

go forward, and see what the Court says.

15

was wrong in the decision, but Illinois acquiesced to Utah for

16

reasons we've talked about, at least on this particular issue,

17

which is quite unique, we would know in Utah what argument that

18

Court believes.

And even if -- even if Illinois were to waive

If the Court says that I

19

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Okay.

20

JUDGE HANSEN:

But nevertheless, I think Utah would

21

still have jurisdiction to proceed and bring everything to an

22

ultimate conclusion based upon simply the agreement of counsel

23

between --or the agreement of the judges between the two states.

24
25

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I think I'm inclined to stay Illinois'

proceedings until the Utah appellate court makes a decision,

-Garcia

& Love

Reporting

*

801-538-23.

40

Sullivan

v.

Sullivan

*

January

8,

2004

1 | because if I proceed here o r even if y o u transferred it h e r e , a n d
2 I agreed that Illinois h a d jurisdiction o r forum n o n conveniens
3 I issues o r for whatever reason, she m a y appeal it h e r e , then we'll
4

have n o t o n l y t w o trial courts --

5

JUDGE HANSEN:

I know, you're --

6

JUDGE VAUGHN:

-- t w o appellate courts.

7

J U D G E HANSEN:

You'll have two a p p e a l s .

8

J U D G E VAUGHN:

9

JUDGE HANSEN:

(Unintelligible.)
If y o u stay it in Illinois, is that

10

stay subject to U t a h proceeding with t h e case jurisdictionally, o r

11

would that -- w o u l d that stay create a situation where there's n o t

12

a jurisdictional resolution, a n d therefore U t a h w o u l d b e limited

13

in p r o c e e d i n g the case o n the custody a n d v i s i t a t i o n issue?

14

That's m y q u e s t i o n .

15
16

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I'm not sure I understand that. R u n

that b y m e a g a i n .

17

J U D G E HANSEN:

Well...

18

J U D G E VAUGHN:

W e stay our p r o c e e d i n g s a n d U t a h

19

determines that they have jurisdiction, what happens t o o u r case

20

h e r e ; is that what you're saying?

21

JUDGE HANSEN:

W e l l , I'm talking about the interim.

22

If y o u stay t h e case there, and maybe that's okay, then does that,

23

b y implication, o r does t h e nature o f t h e stay m a y b e specifically

!4

indicate that y o u stay the issue there - - o r stay the order there?

5 I

JUDGE VAUGHN:
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remains in effect.
{

Yeah, can --

2

JUDGE HANSEN:

3 !

JUDGE VAUGHN: -- previously entered remains in

4

effect

5

JUDGE HANSEN:

Sure.

Can Utah continue then with

6

litigation to try to find resolution in this case?

7

words, litigate the --

In other

8

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Temporary issues.

9

JUDGE HANSEN:

Sure.

10

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I think SO.

11

JUDGE HANSEN:

Your -- your stay probably needs to say

13

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Yes.

14

JUDGE HANSEN:

Would you agree?

15

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

16

JUDGE HANSEN:

12

that then.
*

If you made a stay, if you've stayed

17

the order for temporary child custody, and that order provides

18

that Utah may continue with the litigation in Utah, and that order

19

is -- and we got a copy of it here -- then probably Utah could go

20

forward with the domestic case and resolve the issues and see what

21

the outcome is. Now --

22

JUDGE VAUGHN:

No question Utah is going to have some

23

jurisdiction, because you have jurisdiction over the dissolution

24

case no matter what.

25

JUDGE HANSEN:

Exactly, we have --we have custody
nn
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Now, would the children then stay

in Illinois or would they come back to Utah?

3

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I think they would come back to Utah,

4

because I would be staying our proceedings here and vacating my

5

previous temporary order.

6

JUDGE HANSEN:

7

order here.

8

provisions are.

9

submitted to you?

Right. And then there's a temporary

And I don't know exactly what the visitation
Did you get that in the documents that were

10

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I'm not sure if I do or not.

11

JUDGE HANSEN:

I could...

12

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I think I probably do.

13

They were --

they were pretty thorough about what all they attached.

14

JUDGE HANSEN:

Were they?

15

JUDGE VAUGHN:

I do not have the order.

16

JUDGE HANSEN:

Do you have the minute entry dated

17

November 13, '03?

18

entry of the order to show cause for temporary matters.

19

notice of appeal was filed immediately thereafter, I think.

20

Commissioner David Dillon?

I have...

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Yes.

That's the minute
Then a

I have an order that says order

21

to show cause, Commissioner Dillon, Darwin Hansen, filed December

22

the 5th, if that's the order you're talking --

23
24

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah, that's probably the one. And I

would have signed that because the commissioner recommended it and

25 I there was no objection to it.
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I have one that has a slash and an

JUDGE VAUGHN:

1

2 ' asterisk signaturei in your name.

l

3

JUDGE HANSEN:

Is that the orde r --

4

JUDGE VAUGHN:

By David Dillon.

5

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah, that's probably the one.

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Dated November the 4th, and then mine

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah, that's right.

6

that

7
8

Is

only has --

9
10

in the file.

11

visitation?

12

number 8.

13

That's the order.

Okay, I found it

What does it say about

Does the commissioner work this out?

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Paragraph

Telephonic visitation each Tuesday,

14

Thursday, and Sunday, visitation during Thanksgiving, in paragraph

15

10.

16

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

17

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Christmas, half of Christmas vacation,

18

||

in paragraph 11.

19

JUDGE HANSEN:

Right.

20

JUDGE VAUGHN:

That doesn't cover what happens after

21

that though, I don't think.

And --

There is no order for what happens

22 I after Christmas, other than the telephonic.
23
24

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah.

I... I suspect that Mr. King,

who represents her in -- or him in Utah, could talk with Mr.

25 J Neeley, and if indeed visitation could occur, normally what
29
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1

will -- what would happen is any time the kids are not in school,

2

spring vacation and that sort of thing , where you1 ve got adelay

3

of more than just a weekend.

4

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

5

JUDGE HANSEN:

You know, the kids could go back and be

6

with dad, and then they'd have to share the costs of

7

transportation.

8

pay it all, but I don't know enough about the facts to make that

9

judgment.

Or, since she moved out here, maybe she ought to

But without question, these little children should have

10

as much association with mom and dad as they can, given the

11

geographical distance between them.

12

Utah, any of them would spend as much time with him here in Utah,

13

because he's here, in my judgment.

14

And if he were to come to

Now, the fact that the case is on appeal, I don't...

15

I'm not sure the Utah court can go forward on the issue of custody

16

until that's resolved, unless --

17

JUDGE VAUGHN:

On temporary matters?

18

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well, I think on temporary matters it

19

can. Don't you?

20

JUDGE VAUGHN:

You could reach an ultimate — I think

21

you could on temporary matters, but I don't think you could on

22

ultimate.

23

JUDGE HANSEN:

Not unless --

24

JUDGE VAUGHN:

The jurisdictional issue is determined

25 J by the appellate court.
-an
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Yeah, not unless both parties agreed

2 I and counsel decided not to pursue the appeal.
3

JUDGE VAUGHN:

The only thing out of this whole

4

procedure that troubles me, I guess, is the evidentiary issues on

5

custody.

6

and lived here for two years, physical custody here in Harris, one

7

parent or the other, (unintelligible) teachers and daycare workers

8

to say who was the primary caretaker for the child, and I don't

9

know how that could happen out there, because out there he's not

I said before, if they went to school here for two years

10

been -- I mean, here she would call the school people or daycare

11

people or baby-sitters or somebody to say Wendy always came to

12

parent-teacher conferences or Wendy came to the Christmas program,

13

or whoever the parent was.

14

that would be available for a custody hearing would be here.

15

JUDGE HANSEN:

It seems like most of the witnesses

It -- it may be that: if custody is an

16

issue that both parties wish to pursue to ultimate conclusion,

17

that very little can be done until our court of appeals rules.

18

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

19

JUDGE HANSEN:

But if -- if the order in Illinois is

20

stayed, specifically allowing the children to come back and

21

allowing the case to go forward on temporary matters of custody

22

and visitation, and then maybe on the merits with respect to other

23

issues in the divorce, it may be that counsel ought tc hear it and

24

find a resolution on many of those issues, such that if our court

25 J says that my ruling is in error, then -- then custody would have

Garcia

& Love* Reporting

*

8 01-538-23

46

Sullivan

v.

Sullivan

1 I to be determined in Illinois.

*

January

8,

2 0 04

If the court says no, you were not,

2 | then I suspect custody could be determined here in Utah.
3 I

JUDGE VAUGHN;

Okay.

4

JUDGE HANSEN:

If all other issues were resolved and

5

the only thing unresolved was custody, that might be helpful. And

6

moreover, if the parties, with the benefit of counsel, can make

7

their way through the emotion, and obviously the anger and

8

mistrust that is existing between them, and they resolve some of

9

these other issues, it may create a situation where they can

10

resolve custody.

11

know that doesn't always happen.

12
13

I don't know.

JUDGE VAUGHN:

You hope that, but you and I both

I will then -- let me ask you a final

question on how this will all take place.

14

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

15

JUDGE VAUGHN:

The time frame for if I -- it's 5:00

16

here, it's 5:20 here.

17

JUDGE HANSEN:

Yeah, I'm sorry to keep you after work.

18

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Okay.

And we have a quarterly circuit-

Ifm not sure when I can do it. I

19

wide judges meeting tomorrow.

20

will be here tomorrow afternoon.

21

the proceeding here and vacating the temporary order that Ifve

22

entered here, pending the resolution of the Utah appeal, a time

23

frame for her to -- for the Utah order would be in effect then,

24

temporary custody order, when would she be coming to get the

25

children, or when would I make this effective, this weekend or

If I do an order tomorrow day in

to
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next weekend or?
2 I

JUDGE HANSEN:

It's hard to say.

3 I this as a general proposition:

I -- I would think

I think it's important that the

4

kids get back in school as soon as they can.

And if you were to

5

take those steps, I think you're going to want to probably say in

6

the next week to 10 days, and probably seven, date certain. And

7

if your order is that she needs to go to Illinois to pick up the

8

kids, I'd go down the road maybe a week or 10 days max and say

9

she's to appear at that time, pick up the kids, and she can bring

10

them back to Utah.

I mean, that's -- seems reasonable to me. But

11

on the other hand, if -- if it's done within a day or two, the air

12

fares are going to be the most expensive.

13

so, maybe that will work out, but if it's much longer, then --

If she's gone a week or

14

JUDGE VAUGHN:

The other thing --

15

JUDGE HANSEN:

-- you're getting the kids --

16

JUDGE VAUGHN:

--Mr. Sullivan's attorney here --

17

JUDGE HANSEN:

I know.

18

JUDGE VAUGHN:

-- is a very effective and aggressive

19

domestic relations lawyer, and if I wait 10 days he may very well

2 0 have an appeal filed here.
21
22
23

JUDGE HANSEN:

That will complicate the matter.
Well, then do it as soon as you wish,

do it as soon as you wish, call -JUDGE VAUGHN:

That would make it effective

24

immediately, and I don't know how she'll get v/ord of that or know

25

to come here to -33
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Well, what I will -- this is what

I received a pleading filed by her lawyer here

asking me to give you a call.

4

JUDGE VAUGHN:

5

here,

6

morning.

7

January

*

Yes, I have a copy of that, the order

from Mr. Sullivan's lawyer here, faxed me that this

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay. And when I got that, I then got

8

both lawyers on the telephone, Mr. Neeley and Mr. King here in

9

Utah, and I said I -- I have this request, and Ifm willing to call

10

Judge Vaughn and talk with him, but I want both lawyers to know

11

and to feel comfortable with my doing that.

12

that's okay, and so did Mr. Neeley.

13

file a minute -- prepare a minute entry, and I would send them a

14

copy of the minute entry.

15

think both of them agree, based upon a couple of cases in Utah,

16

asking if I could, you know, put this on the record and have a

17

verbatim record.

18

cases simply require that I take notes and keep the notes.

19

the other hand, if Judge Vaughn has no objection, Ifm willing to

20

put it on the record.

21
22
23
24

And Mr. King said

And I told them that I would

They said, well, in addition to that, I

And 1 said I can do that, but I think those

JUDGE VAUGHN:

But on

Do you have an electronic recording

record or do you have a court reporter there taking -JUDGE HANSEN:
electronic record.

No, no court reporter; it's a video

I do have my clerk here because I need her to

25 J do a minute entry, and she's very good at it.
34
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I will tomorrow -- I won't do it

2 | tonight, and I have a meeting in the morning from 8:00 until noon,
3 | I have to come back here at 1:30 to take a plea on a drug case, so
4 I I will be here at 1:30, and I will make an entry at 1:30, or as
5

soon as the plea is taken, staying these proceedings here pending

S

the outcome of the Utah appeal, and vacating our previous

7

temporary order and deferring to Utah for it.

8

JUDGE HANSEN:

Could you fax that --

9

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Yeah, I think I'll put in my order that

10

(unintelligible) completing jurisdiction pending the outcome of

11

the Utah appeal.

12
13

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

Let's -- then let me give you my

fax number, and I would appreciate it if you would fax that to me. j^

14

JUDGE VAUGHN:

All right.

15

JUDGE HANSEN:

Then what I will do is prepare a minute

16

entry for our conversation, and then I will attach your order

17

vacating -- staying and vacating, and then I will send to both

18

counsel here in Utah my minute entry and your order, and I'll send

19

you a copy of my minute entry.

20

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

21

JUDGE HANSEN:

22

Does that make sense?

And my fax number is area code

(801) 447-3880.

23

JUDGE VAUGHN:

What is your regular phone number?

24

JUDGE HANSEN:

My regular phone number, area code

25

(801) 447-3840.

1

And you'll get my clerk when you call that
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If in fact I am not here --or she is not here and you

2 I want to call me directly, it's 447-384...
3 1

THE CLERK: Three.

4

JUDGE HANSEN:

5

Three.

That will -- that rings the

phone on my desk.

6

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Okay.

7

JUDGE HANSEN:

Now, let me tell you, I -- next week

8

I'm going to be out of town, we have a vacation for next week, so

9

I'll be gone as of tomorrow night, but I'll be back a week from

10

Monday.

11

JUDGE VAUGHN:

All right.

I travel, I'm -- this is my

12

home county, but I'm only here two days a week.

13

12-county circuit that I travel.

We have a

14

JUDGE HANSEN:

Oh, I see.

15

JUDGE VAUGHN:

And I am in other counties two days a

17

JUDGE HANSEN:

Okay.

18

JUDGE VAUGHN:

The number you call, we have an

16

week.

19

answering machine here with that number, but I carry a cell phone

20

with me, I almost sleep with it, but that number is (618)

21

925-1162.

22

JUDGE HANSEN:

23

JUDGE VAUGHN:

1162.

24

JUDGE HANSEN:

1162.

25

JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes.

-Garcia

& Love

(618) 925?
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*

JUDGE HANSEN:

All right.

3

JUDGE VAUGHN:

Thank you.

.4

JUDGE HANSEN:

It's been great --

5

JUDGE VAUGHN:

How far are you from Salt Lake City?

6

JUDGE HANSEN:

Well, we're a bedroom community.

1
2

7
8

Judge Vaughn, thank you

very much.

probably maybe 15 to 18 miles.
JUDGE VAUGHN:

9

Okay.
•

*

*

10
11
12

14 I
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

-Garcia

& Love

Reporting

*

801-538-233

52

We're

Sullivan

v. Sullivan

*

January

8,

2004

C E R T I F I C A T E

1
2

STATE OF UTAH

)

3

COUNTY OF DAVIS)

I, Lisa Collman, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary-

4
5

Public within and for the County of Davis and the State of Utah,

6

do hereby certify:

7

8 |

That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the

9 I time and place herein set forth, and were taken down by me in
10

shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting under my

11

direction and supervision.

12
13
14

That the foregoing 3 6 pages contain a true and correct
transcription of my shorthand notes so taken.

15
16
17

In witness thereof, I have hereunto transcribed my name and
affixed my seal this 22nd day of January, 2004.

18

/

/ /

19
20

K^

'? JJ

Jaisa Collman, CSR

21
My Commission E x p i r e s :

22
8 J u l y 2 004

V ~ * l ' //

23

JJJ'8-H 2::^
blA«C'>FU7

24
25

-Garcia

& Love

Reporting-

*

801-538-233.
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IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

<*«*• A ^ a u l c o S t t D;$T

FIFTH DISTRICT
MARK ALLEN SULLIVAN,

) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
) Hamilton County.

Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

) No. 03-F-5

WENDY SULLIVAN,

) Honorable
) Barry I,. Vaughan,
) Judge, presiding.

Respondent-Appellee,

R U L E 23 O R D E R
Petitioner, Mark Sullivan, appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider the order
entered by the circuit court of Hamilton County setting aside a preliminary injunction that
gave him temporary custody of the parties' children. The appeal is pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 111. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). We affirm.
Mark Sullivan and Wendy Sullivan, respondent, were married on August 26, 1995,
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. During the course of their marriage, two children were born
of the parties, namely: Brett Vemon Sullivan, born April 2,1996, and Sydney June Sullivan,
bom July 18, 1997. The parties became residents of Illinois in December 1999 and resided
in West Frankfort, Franklin County, Illinois. In June 2001, they moved to Tbompsonville,
Hamilton County. Illinois. In June 2002, Wendy took the children to Utah to visit her
family, and according to Mark, she notified him on July 2 that she was not returning to
Illinois and intended to terminate the parties' marriage.
On September 26, 2002, Wendy filed in Utah a complaint for the dissolution of the
parties' marriage and for the custody of the children. On December 26, 2002, Mark entered

1
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his appearance and moved to dismiss the Utah proceedings. On January 28,2003, Wendy
opened a new file in Utah and? for a second time, filed for the dissolution of the parties'
marriage and for the custody of the children On April 7, 2003, Mark filed a petition for the
custody of the children in Hamilton County, Illinois, and on April 22, he filed an answer and
objection to jurisdiction in the second dissolution proceeding initiated by Wendy in Utah.
On May 5, 2003, Wendy entered her pro se appearance in the Illinois action filed by Mark.
Wendy also filed an answer in which she stated that she had previously filed a complaint for
the dissolution of the marriage and for the custody of the children in Davis County, Utah, in
January 2003. On May 15,2003, Utah judge Honorable Darwin C. Hansen granted Wendy's
motion to dismiss her original complaint. On August 7, 2003, Judge Hansen denied Mark's
request to reinstate Wendy's original complaint and to consolidate it with her second
complaint for dissolution. Judge Hansen also found that Utah had jurisdiction to decide the
dissolution and custody issues presented and referred the case to a commissioner for further
proceedings. Judge Hansen's decision determining that Utah had jurisdiction over this matter
is currently pending before the Utah Court of Appeals (Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. 20030957
(docketed November 26, 2003)).
On November 13, 2003, a hearing was conducted before Commissioner David S.
Dillion pertaining to the custody of the parties' children, child support, and visitation.
Wendy was present and was represented by counsel. Mark was not present but was
represented by counsel. On December 5, 2003, the Utah court entered an order granting
Wendy temporary custody of the minor children and granting Mark visitation during the
Christmas season, Mark exercised his right to visitation pursuant to the Utah order and
returned the children to Illinois. While the children were still in Illinois, Mark filed an ex
parte emergency petition for temporary custody in the State of Illinois.

Judge Bany

Vaughan found that Utah's temporary custody order was not entitled to full faith and credit,

2

because Utah did not have proper jurisdiction over the child custody issue in the case. As
a result, the court granted the ex parte request and scheduled the hearing on the preliminary
injunction for Januaiy 5,2004. On Januaiy 2,2004, Wendy was served with the petition and
a notice of the hearing. On January 5,2004, Wendy was found in default, and a preliminary
injunction was entered granting Mark temporary custody of the children.
On January 8, 2004, counsel in Utah for Wendy and Mark arranged for a telephone
conference between Judge Hansen and Judge Vaughan pursuant to section 7(c) of the
Unifonn Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Act);
"If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court
assumed jurisdiction[,] it shall stay tfie proceeding and communicate with the court
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in
the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance with
Sections 20 through 23 of this Act If a court of this State has made a custody
judgment before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another statefj
jt shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a
proceeding was commenced in another state after tl assumed jurisdiction^] it shall
likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the most
appropriate forum." 750 ILCS 35/7(c) (West 2002).l
lr

rhc Unifonn Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has since been repealed and replaced,

effective January 1,2004, by the Unifonn Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(Pub. Act 93-108, art. 1, §§101, 404, eff. January 1, 2004 (repealing 750 ILCS 35/1 etseq.
and adding 750 ILCS 36/101 ct seq.)). Motions or other requests for relief made in childcustody proceedings or to enforce child-custody determinations that had been commenced
before the effective date of the new act are governed by the law in effect at the time the
3
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After the telephone conference, Judge Vaughan made the following entry m the case
record sheet:
"Court receives telephone call % 4:30 p.m. from Judge Darwin C. Hanson [sic], 2*
Judicial District, Utah; a record of the proceedings was made by Judge Hansen; judges
discuss jurisdictional issues & fact of two contrary terapforary] cust[ody] orders;
teleconference per 15 [sic] ILCS 35/§§ 7 & 8; judges agree that Illinois court will stay
per § 7 its proceedings pending decision from Utah Appellate Court. Preliminary
injunction entered granting temporary custody to father is vacated effective 1-12-04
at noon per § 7(c). In staying these proceedings, the IL & UT courts agree that the
appeal pending in Utah is controlling; the IL court is not declining jurisdiction nor [sic]
conceding jurisdiction but deferring to the Utah Appellate Court; there is no question
Utah has jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings; Utah had a temporary custody
order in place at the time the IL tempforary] custody was entered; the court is also
troubled by [the] fact Mark f(]husband[)] did not file a custody action in IL until 4-703, 9 months after wife left, 6 months after wife filed proceedings in Utah, & 4
month[sJ after husband filed an answer in Utah; had husband filed custody in IL
sooner, there is no question IL would be the home state; at this point in the
proceedings Judge Vaughan & Judge Hansen agree this is a matter best left to the Utah
court of appeals."
The Act was adopted in both Illinois and Utah. 750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2002);
Utah Code Ann, §78-45c-101 et seq. (2002),

The Act seeks to avoid jurisdictional

competitions and conflicts between states, to protect children's best interests, and to
discourage forum shopping. In re Marriage ofRizza, 237 III. App. 3d 83, 87, 603 N.E.2d
134, \3% (1992). Accordingly, the Act achieves certainty by providing that the first state to
motions or other requests were made.
4

exercise jurisdiction has the exclusive right to proceed. In re Marriage o/Kneitz, 341 TIL
App. 3d 299,304,793 N.E.2d 988, 993 (2003); see also In re Marriage ofLudwinski, 329 111.
App. 3d 1149, 1154. 769 N.E 2d 1094, 1099 (2002). Specifically, section 7(a) of the Act
provides as follows:
"A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the time of
filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a
court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act,
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a
more appropriate forum or for other reasons." 750ILCS 35/7(a) (West 2002).
Similarly, section 14 states:
"The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification
judgment of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory
provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this judgment
has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar
to those of this Act." 750 ILCS 35/14 (West 2002).
Before resolving this matter, it is important to identify what is and what is not before
the court. The limited issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dissolving
the preliminary injunction it had previously entered. Controverted facts or the merits of the
case are not d^cid^d where, as here, an interlocutory appeal is brought pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 III. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Yates v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 193 HI.
App. 3d 431, 437, 549 N.E.2d 1010, 1014 (1990). The only issue in such an appeal is
"whether there was a sufficient showing to sustain the order of the trial court granting or
denying the relief sought" Yates, 193 TU. App. 3d at 437, 549 N.E.2d at 1014; see also
Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 111. App. 3d 959, 962, 614 N.E.2d 1312, 1315-16

5

(1993).
Mark frames the issue as follows: "Whether the Illinois circuit court erred in deferring
subject matter jurisdiction to the State of Utah?" The court did not decline subject matter
jurisdiction in the case. If it had, Mark's petition would have been dismissed, The court
specifically found that Illinois was "not declining jurisdiction nor [sic] conceding jurisdiction"
to Utah. Judge Vaughan decided to wait until the Utah appellate court decided Mark's appeal
of the Utah trial judge's decision regarding jurisdiction. We believe that Judge Vaughanfs
actions were consistent with the general purpose of the Act:
"to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other States in child
custody matters; [to] promote cooperation with the courts of other States; [to] assure
that child custody litigation occurs in the State where the child and his or her family
has the closest connection, and where evidence of the child's care, protection,
training!,] and personal relationships is most readily available; to discourage
controversies over child custody matters; to deter abductions; and to avoid relitigation
of child custody decisions of other States." Richardson v. Richardson, 255 III. App.
3d 1099, 1100-01, 625 N.E.2d 1122, U23 (1993).
Mark wisely appealed the Utah trial judge's ruling on jurisdiction. If he had failed to
appeal the Utah decision, he would not be able to argue in Illinois that the Utah trial court had
erred on the jurisdictional issue. See In re Marriage ofArulpragasam & Eisele, 304 111. App.
3d 139, 146, 709 N.E.2d 725, 731 (1999); In re Marriage ofMauro, 187 111. App. 3d 794,
797, 543 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1989). We also find that the Illinois trial judge in this case made
a sound decision in vacating the preliminary injunction and effectively staying the Illinois
action until the Utah appellate court renders a decision on Mark's appeal. We agree that this
was the most effective and efficient way to fulfill the purpose of the Act.

6

Affirmed.

DONOVAN, J., with HOPKINS and WELCH, JJ., concumng.
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